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Abstract
This paper assesses the empirical relevance of ﬁnancial frictions in the Euro Area (EA) and the
United States (US). It provides a comprehensive set of comparisons between two models: (i)
a Smets and Wouters (2007) (SW) model with ﬁnancial frictions originating in non-ﬁnancial
ﬁrms à la Bernanke et al. (1999) (SWBGG); and (ii) a SW model with frictions originating in
ﬁnancial intermediaries, à la Gertler and Karadi (2011) (SWGK). Proved that the introduction
of ﬁnancial frictions in either way improves the models' ﬁt compared to a standard SW model,
the empirical comparisons reveal that the SWGK model outperforms the SWBGG model both
in the EA and the US. Two main factors explain this result: ﬁrst, the magnitude of the ﬁnancial
accelerator eﬀect; and second, the role of the investment-speciﬁc technology shock in aﬀecting
ﬁnancial variables.
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1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis the structure of the ﬁnancial system has received an increasing
attention in the literature (see Brunnermeier et al., 2012, for a survey). The features of external
ﬁnancing are particularly relevant because of its impact on business cycle ﬂuctuations. Since the
onset of the crisis developments in credit markets have changed substantially: total ﬁnancing to
non-ﬁnancial corporations have declined both in the Euro Area (EA) and in the United States (US).
At their peak following the collapse of the Lehman Brothers, the credit spreads skyrocketed.
The dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) literature oﬀers alternative micro-foundation
of ﬁnancial market frictions. The inﬂuential model of Bernanke et al. (1999) (BGG) is considered
as a workhorse for the analysis of credit market imperfections in DSGE modelling. The BGG model
features constrained ﬁrms that are the source of frictions in the form of a costly state veriﬁcation
problem (Townsend, 1979). Much of the macroeconomic literature stemming from BGG emphasizes
credit market constraints on non-ﬁnancial borrowers and treats ﬁnancial intermediaries largely as a
veil. Gertler and Karadi (2011) (GK), instead, explicitly model the banking sector as a source of
ﬁnancial frictions due to the presence of a moral hazard problem. Another approach is oﬀered by the
seminal paper of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), who focus on adverse selection as a source of ﬁnancial
frictions (see also Christiano and Ikeda, 2011).
Given such a variety of approaches, this paper investigates which type of ﬁnancial frictions is
favored by the data. It empirically compares for the period 1983Q1-2008Q3 using EA and US data:
(i) the Smets and Wouters (2007)(SW) model; (ii) the SWBGG model, which incorporates ﬁnancial
frictions à la Bernanke et al. (1999)  where lenders pay a ﬁxed monitoring cost to observe the
borrowers' realized return  in a SW economy; and (iii) the SWGK model, where the ﬁnancial inter-
mediary (FI, henceforth) faces endogenously determined balance sheet constraints. In the literature
there are other papers presenting a SW economy with the ﬁnancial accelerator à la BGG; examples
are Queijo von Heideken (2009), Gelain (2010), Carrillo and Poilly (2013), Del Negro and Schorfheide
(2013), and Christiano et al. (2014). The choice of these two modelling strategies  BGG and GK 
for micro-founding ﬁnancial frictions can be explained by: (i) the established importance of the BGG
approach in the mainstream DSGE literature on ﬁnancial frictions; (ii) the important role assigned
to ﬁnancial intermediaries in the GK model; and (iii) their relative analytical tractability. These
two models also share a common feature, i.e. ﬁnancial frictions originate in the group of agents that
borrow and borrowing capacity is linked to net worth. An empirical comparison between the two
approaches is novel in the DSGE arena.
As a ﬁrst step, this paper ﬁnds that the introduction of ﬁnancial frictions either à la BGG
or GK improves the models' ﬁt, suggesting that these frictions are empirically relevant both in
the EA and the US and this is in line with what Queijo von Heideken (2009) ﬁnds by comparing
the SW and BGG models. The paper then focuses on the comparison between the SWBGG and
SWGK models by examining: business cycle moments, models-implied spread, impulse responses,
variance decomposition, and forecasting performance. The novel result is that the SWGK model
outperforms the SWBGG model because of two main reasons. First, impulse response function
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analysis reveals that the magnitude of the ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect is diﬀerent across the two
models. The presence of the banking sector acts as a powerful ampliﬁcation channel. The ﬁnancial
accelerator eﬀect embedded in the SWGK model is indeed stronger than that in the SWBGG model
for those shocks which are the main drivers of business cycle ﬂuctuations. Disruptions in ﬁnancial
markets are generally associated with a rise in the credit spread and a contraction in the quantity
of credit. However, while a rise in the spread causes a decline in net worth of ﬁrms in the SWBGG
model, ﬁnancial intermediaries beneﬁt from a rise in the spread because of the positive eﬀects on
the relevant net worth in the SWGK model. This mechanism generally leads to a stronger rise
in the spread in the SWGK model with more severe eﬀects on investment and, hence, on output
compared to the SWBGG model. Therefore, the SWGK model provides a better solution to the
so-called small shocks, large cycles puzzle (Bernanke et al., 1996). The second reason is that the
investment-speciﬁc technology shock plays a diﬀerent role in the two models, both in the EA and the
US: it explains a larger fraction of the spread in the SWBGG model compared to that in the SWGK
model. However, this shock does not replicate the comovement between output and investment and
the countercyclical behavior of the spread. Hence, its larger role in the SWBGG model provides
another reasons for the better empirical performance of the SWGK model. Point forecast evaluation
reveals that the SWGK model is favored also along this dimension in the EA, while in the US there
is no clear evidence of an outperformed model in terms of forecasting accuracy.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy presents the models. Section 3 de-
scribes the data and discusses the estimation strategy. Section 4 compares the estimated models,
discusses the propagation mechanisms and presents models' forecasting performance. Finally, Sec-
tion 5 concludes. An online appendix complements the paper by providing (a) the full details of the
models; (b) an analysis aiming at disentangling the eﬀects of the magnitude of the ﬁnancial frictions
on impulse response functions; (c) a series of robustness checks for the empirical results.
2 The Models
This section brieﬂy sketches the three DSGE models. Compared to the standard SW economy, the
diﬀerent features are: (i) a utility function comparable with Smets and Wouters (2003) and Gertler
and Karadi (2011); (ii) the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator for ﬁnal output and composite labor, as in Galí
et al. (2011); (iii) the price mark-up, wage mark-up and government shocks are modelled as in Smets
and Wouters (2003); and (iv) the presence of ﬁnancial frictions in the SWBGG and SWGK models,
which changes the production side of the economy. In order to simplify the optimization problems
of intermediate goods ﬁrms, retailers are the source of price stickiness.
In all models the economy is populated by: households; labor unions; labor packers; retailers;
ﬁnal good ﬁrms; intermediate goods ﬁrms; and the policymaker. In the SWBGG and SWGK models
the economy is also populated by capital producers, while the SWGK model incorporates FI.
Households consume, save, and supply labor. A labor union diﬀerentiates labor and sets wages in
a monopolistically competitive market. Competitive labor packers buy labor service from the union,
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package and sell it to intermediate goods ﬁrms. The good market has a similar structure: retailers
buy goods from intermediate goods ﬁrms, diﬀerentiate them and sell them in a monopolistically
competitive market. The aggregate ﬁnal good is produced by perfectly competitive ﬁrms assembling
a continuum of intermediate goods. The policymaker sets the nominal interest rate following a
Taylor rule.
In the SWBGG model, intermediate goods ﬁrms maximize the ﬂow of discounted proﬁts by
choosing the quantity of factors for production and stipulate a ﬁnancial contract to obtain funds
from lenders. At the end of period t, ﬁrms buy capital Kt+1 that will be used throughout time
t + 1 at the real price Qt. The cost of purchased capital is then QtKt+1. A fraction of capital
acquisition is ﬁnanced by their net worth, Nt+1, and the remainder by borrowing. In order to
ensure that entrepreneurial net worth will never be enough to fully ﬁnance capital acquisitions, it is
assumed that each ﬁrm survives until the next period with probability θ and her expected lifetime
is consequently equal to 1/(1 − θ). At the same time, the new ﬁrms entering receive a transfer,
N et , from ﬁrms who die and depart from the scene.
1 There is a problem of asymmetric information
about the project' s ex-post return because the return to capital is sensitive to an idiosyncratic
shock. While the ﬁrm can costlessy observe the realization of the shock, the lender has to pay a
ﬁxed auditing cost to observe borrower's return. If the ﬁrm pays in full there is no need to verify
the project's return; but in the case of default the lender veriﬁes the state and pays the cost. As
a consequence, the ﬁnancial contract implies an external ﬁnance premium, EP (·), i.e. a diﬀerence
between the cost of external and internal funds, that depends on the inverse of the ﬁrm's leverage
ratio. FI are just a veil in the model (Gilchrist and Zakraj²ek, 2011). Capital producers purchase
investment and depreciated capital to transform them into capital sold to intermediate goods ﬁrms
and used for production.
In the SWGK model, within each household there are two types of members at any point in
time: the fraction g of the household members are workers and the fraction (1 − g) are bankers.
The FI have a ﬁnite horizon in order to avoid the possibility of full self-ﬁnancing. Every banker
stays banker next period with a probability θ, which is independent of history. Therefore, every
period (1 − θ) bankers exit and become workers. Similarly, a number of workers become bankers,
keeping the relative proportion of each type of agents constant. The household provides her new
banker with a start-up transfer, which is a small fraction, χ, of total assets. Each banker manages a
ﬁnancial intermediary. The production sector is also made of intermediate goods ﬁrms and capital
producers. The optimization problem of capital producers is the same as in the SWBGG model. The
intermediate goods ﬁrms ﬁnance their capital acquisitions each period by obtaining funds from the
FI. While there are no ﬁnancial frictions in this activity, there is a problem of moral hazard between
FI and households, because the former can choose to divert a fraction λ of available funds from the
project. Hence an incentive compatibility constraint should hold in order to make households willing
to deposit money in the FI; as a result, the assets the FI can acquire depend positively on their net
worth.
1Following Christensen and Dib (2008), consumption of exiting ﬁrms  a small fraction of total consumption  is
ignored in the general equilibrium.
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The detailed linearized models are shown in Table 1.2
3 Data and estimation strategy
In each model there are seven orthogonal structural shocks: the technology, εat ; the investment-
speciﬁc technology, εxt ; the monetary policy, ε
r
t ; the capital quality, ε
k
t ;
3 the government, εgt ; the
price mark-up, εpt ; and the wage mark-up, ε
w
t , shocks. In each model, the shocks follow an AR(1)
process.
The models are estimated with quarterly data for the period 1983Q1-2008Q3, using as observables
real GDP, real investment, real private consumption, hours worked, GDP deﬂator inﬂation, real
wage and the nominal interest rate. The starting date is the same used by Smets and Wouters
(2005), while the ﬁnal quarter corresponds to the pre-crisis period since the purpose of this paper
is to make a comparison among the models in normal times. Moreover, ending in 2008Q3 allows
to avoid potential distortionary eﬀects on the estimates of the zero lower bound on the nominal
interest rate (Galí et al., 2011). Data come from the Area Wide Model database (see Fagan et al.,
2005, for an explanation) for the Euro Area, and from the NIPA tables of the Bureau of Economic
Analysis and the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the United States. Following Smets and Wouters
(2007), all variables are logged, but the nominal interest rate which is expressed in quarterly terms.
GDP, consumption, investment and wages are expressed in ﬁrst diﬀerences. The inﬂation rate is
measured as a quarterly log-diﬀerence of GDP deﬂator. US hours of work are multiplied by civilian
employment, expressed in per capita terms and demeaned. Data on EA employment are used since
there are no data available for hours worked in the Euro Area  equation (12) in Table 1.
The following set of measurement equations show the link between the observables in the dataset
and the endogenous variables of the DSGE model:
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(1)
where γ is the common quarterly trend growth rate of GDP, consumption, investment and wages;
p¯i is the steady-state quarterly inﬂation rate; and r¯n is the steady-state quarterly nominal interest
rate. A hat over a variable indicates the log-deviation from steady state.
2More details are available in the online appendix.
3The Smets and Wouters (2007) model features a risk premium shock, which is meant to proxy frictions in the
process of ﬁnancial intermediation (not explicitly modelled). Since the SWBGG and SWGK models provide an explicit
microfoundation for ﬁnancial frictions, the risk premium shock has been replaced with the ﬁnancial shock proposed
by Gertler and Karadi. Exercises for the Euro Area (Villa, 2013)  with a diﬀerent ﬁltering technique  show that
the main result of the paper still holds in the presence of the risk premium shock instead of the capital quality shock.
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3.1 Calibration and priors
The parameters which cannot be identiﬁed in the dataset and/or are related to steady state values
of the variables are calibrated. The time period in the model corresponds to one quarter in the data.
Table 2 shows the calibration of the parameters common to both models. The discount factor, β,
is equal to 0.99, implying a quarterly steady state real interest rate of 1%; the capital income share, α,
is equal to 0.33. The depreciation rate is equal to 0.025, corresponding to an annual depreciation rate
of 10%. The ratio of government spending to GDP is equal to 0.20. The elasticities of substitution
in goods and labor markets are equal to 6 in order to target a gross steady state mark up of 1.20,
as in Christiano et al. (2014), among many others.
The calibration of the ﬁnancial parameters is shown in Table 3. The parameter θ represents
the survival rate of intermediate goods ﬁrms in the SWBGG model and of FI in the SWGK model.
This parameter is set equal to 0.972 implying an expected working life for bankers and ﬁrms of
almost a decade; this value is close to those in BGG and GK. In the SWBGG model the parameter
pinning down the steady state spread, S, is set to match the steady state spread of 150 basis points.
Following BGG, the ratio of capital to net worth is set to 2, implying that 50% of ﬁrm's capital
expenditures are externally ﬁnanced. As long as the calibration of the SWGK model is concerned,
the fraction of assets given to new bankers, χ, and the fraction of assets that can be diverted, λ,
are equal to 0.001 and 0.515, respectively, to target the same steady state spread of 150 basis points
and a steady state leverage ratio of 4.4 The online appendix investigates the robustness of the main
results to the calibration of the ﬁnancial parameters.
Table 4 shows the assumptions for the prior distributions of the estimated parameters for both
models; the prior distributions are the same for both countries. The choice of the functional forms
of parameters and the location of the prior mean correspond to a large extent to those in Smets
and Wouters (2003, 2007) where applicable. The prior of some model-speciﬁc parameters are as
follows. The parameter measuring the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply follows a
Normal distribution with a prior mean of 0.33, the value used by Gertler and Karadi (2011), and a
loose standard deviation of 0.25. The elasticity of external ﬁnance premium with respect to leverage
of ﬁrms is assumed to follow a Beta distribution with prior mean of 0.05 and standard deviation of
0.05, which implies [0.002, 0.151] 90% prior interval.
4 Models comparison
This section performs empirical comparisons among the models estimated both for the Euro Area
and United States, with a focus on the SWBGG and SWGK models since this is the novel part of
the paper. The comparison is made along the following dimensions: (i) the estimated parameters
and the likelihood race; (ii) simulated business cycle moments versus those in the data and models-
implied spread; (iii) impulse response functions and variance decomposition; and (iv) the forecasting
4Compared to Gertler and Karadi (2011), the higher value of the steady state spread is targeted with a higher
calibration of the parameter λ.
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performance. The online appendix presents some robustness exercises.
4.1 Estimated parameters and likelihood race
The mean of the estimated parameters for each model is computed with two chains of the Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm with a sample of 250,000 draws.5 Table 4 reports the posterior mean with 95%
probability intervals in parentheses of the SWBGG and SWGK models for the Euro Area and the
United States. Most parameters are remarkably similar across the two models. As in Smets and
Wouters (2005), the fact that in almost all the cases the posterior estimate of a parameter in one
model falls in the estimated conﬁdence band for the same parameter of the other model can be
considered as a rough measure of similarity.
As far as the Euro Area is concerned, the degree of price stickiness reveals that ﬁrms adjust prices
about every year and half, with a higher degree of stickiness in SWGK model. The Calvo parameter
for wage stickiness reveals that the average duration of wage contracts is slightly more than a year,
lower than the degree of price stickiness, as in Smets and Wouters (2003). There is a moderate degree
of price indexation and a higher degree of wage indexation similarly to previous estimates for the
EA (Adolfson et al., 2008; Gerali et al., 2010). The mean of the parameter measuring the elasticity
of capital utilization is higher than its prior mean, revealing that capital utilization is more costly
than assumed a-priori. The estimated value in both models favors high costs of capital utilization,
suggesting a minor role for this internal propagation mechanism, in line with the literature (e.g.
Adolfson et al., 2007; Christoﬀel et al., 2008).6 The estimates of the parameter measuring the
Taylor rule reaction to inﬂation are also in line with previous estimates for the EA, with a higher
value in the SWBGG model. There is also evidence of short-term reaction to the current change
in the output gap. Turning to the exogenous shock processes, all shocks are quite persistent but
the wage mark-up shock. The mean of the standard errors of the shocks is in line with the similar
studies of the EA, but the standard deviation of the investment-speciﬁc technology shock which is
higher.
As far as the US economy is concerned, the two models with ﬁnancial frictions feature a higher
degree of price stickiness compared to the value found by Smets and Wouters (2007), since average
length of price contract is more than two years. Our results are in line with Del Negro et al. (2013).
Similarly to the EA, the estimates of the parameter measuring the elasticity of capital utilization
are higher than the prior mean, rather in line with the value found by Smets and Wouters for the
period 1984-2004, equal to 0.69. There is evidence of a relatively low external superﬁcial habit in
consumption, similarly to the results by De Graeve (2008). The estimates of the shock processes are
generally similar among the models, but in the SWBGG model the investment-speciﬁc technology
shock has a lower persistence and volatility compared to the SWGK model.
5Version 4.3.3 of the Dynare toolbox for Matlab is used for the computations. For details on the Bayesian estimation
procedure see Fernández-Villaverde (2010), among others.
6In a calibrated real business cycle model Villa (2012) shows that capital utilization play a limited role in amplifying
the eﬀects of the shocks hitting the economy. It should also be noted that parameter ζ is a transformation of parameter
ψ, estimated by Smets and Wouters (2003). In particular, ζ = 1/(1 + ψ). Following Smets and Wouters (2007), the
parameter ζ ∈ [0, 1] is estimated.
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The estimated mean of the elasticity of the external ﬁnance premium with respect to the leverage
position is equal to 0.04 in the Euro Area and to 0.05 in the United States. Also in this case the
posterior estimate of this parameter for one country falls in the estimated conﬁdence band for the
same parameter of the other country.7An estimated elasticity diﬀerent from zero is a ﬁrst piece of
evidence in favor of a model with ﬁnancial frictions.
The Bayes factor (BF) is used to judge the relative ﬁt of the models, as in An and Schorfheide
(2007), among many others.8 According to Jeﬀreys (1998), a BF of 3− 10 provides slight evidence
in favor of model i; a BF in the range [10− 100] provides strong to very strong evidence in favor
of model i; and a BF greater than 100 provides decisive evidence.
The main results are shown in Table 5. As a ﬁrst step, the comparison is made with the SW
model featuring perfect ﬁnancial markets. The introduction of ﬁnancial frictions à la BGG leads
to an improvement of the marginal likelihood for both EA and US data, suggesting that these
frictions are empirically relevant. This result conﬁrms the ﬁndings by Queijo von Heideken (2009),
among others. Second, the empirical relevance of ﬁnancial frictions in the Euro Area is stronger
in the model featuring frictions at the level of ﬁnancial intermediaries. The Bayes factor points to
decisive evidence in favor of the SWGK model versus the SWBGG model, as shown in the last row
of Table 5. This result is true also for the United States: the comparison between the two models
with ﬁnancial frictions provides decisive evidence in favor of the SWGK model.
4.2 Business cycle moments and models-implied spread
In order to investigate which features of the data are better captured by the SWGK model, this
subsection ﬁrst shows the comparison between the moments generated by the models and those
in the data, as in Iacoviello and Neri (2010). It then investigates whether the estimated models
generates proxies of the spread with business cycle ﬂuctuations in line with the data.
Table 6 shows relative standard deviations, cross-correlations and autocorrelations of output,
investment, consumption, inﬂation and the nominal interest rate within the 90% highest posterior
7Queijo von Heideken (2009) ﬁnds that ﬁnancial frictions are larger in the Euro Area compared to United States
since the estimates of monitoring costs are higher in the ﬁrst country. Our estimation strategy is not necessarily
in contrast with her results. Following Meier and Muller (2006), Kamber et al. (2012) and Fernández and Gulan
(2014), from the value of the elasticity it is possible to trace out the values of the deep parameters of the ﬁnancial
contract, which are also consistent with the calibrated parameters shown in Tables 2 and 3. As far as the Euro Area
is concerned, these values are: a share of monitoring costs equal to 0.22; a standard deviation of the idiosyncratic
shock to ﬁrm's return equal to 0.25; the resulting quarterly business failure rate is 0.02/4. For the United States they
are: a share of monitoring costs equal to 0.17; a standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock to ﬁrm's return equal
to 0.32; the resulting quarterly business failure rate is 0.025/4.
8Such a comparison is based on the marginal likelihood of alternative models. Let mi be a given model, with
mi ∈ M , θ the parameter vector and pi(θ|mi) the prior density for model mi. The marginal likelihood for a given
model mi and common dataset Y is
L(Y |mi) =
ˆ
θ
L(Y |θ,mi)pi(θ|mi)dθ, (2)
where L(Y |θ,mi) is the likelihood function for the observed data Y conditional on the parameter vector and on the
model; and L(Y |mi) is the marginal data density. The Bayes factor is the ratio between the marginal likelihoods.
The log data density of the three models is computed with the Geweke (1999)'s modiﬁed harmonic mean estimator.
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density interval.9
As far as the Euro Area is concerned, the comparison of the relative standard deviations of
investment and consumption (with respect to output) shows that for both the SWBGG and SWGK
models the conﬁdence bands contain the empirical standard deviations. The SWGK model ﬁts all
the variables better compared to the SWBGG model in terms of the value of the posterior mean.
However, both models performs poorly in replicating the relative standard deviations of interest
rate and inﬂation since the models' business cycle statistics are outside the empirical standard
deviations.10
The comparison of the cross-correlation with output reveals that the SWBGG and the SWGK
models cannot reproduce the cross-correlation of investment and the SWBGG performs worse. The
SWGK model ﬁts the data better than the SWBGG model in terms of cross-correlations of consump-
tion, inﬂation and interest rate, although results are rather similar since business cycle statistics of
the data are within conﬁdence bands of both models.
Table 6 ﬁnally reports the autocorrelation coeﬃcients of order 1. Variables are more autocorre-
lated in the two models than in the data, as in Gabriel et al. (2011). When it comes to matching
inﬂation, the models are from replicating its dynamics in the data. Overall, the presence ﬁnancial
frictions originating in ﬁnancial intermediaries is preferable in the data compared to a model where
ﬁnancial frictions originate in non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms, in particular as far as investment dynamics is
concerned.
The comparison of simulated business cycle moments between the two models in the United
States is similar to that in the EA. Also for the United States the two models perform poorly in
replicating the relative standard deviations of inﬂation and interest rate, while the SWGK model
gets closer to the data in replicating the cross-correlation of investment.
Figure 1 reports the models-implied spread, in percent deviations from their steady state values,
within a 95% conﬁdence band, along with the percent deviations from HP(1600) trends of a proxy of
the credit spread in EA data. The series is computed as BBB rated bonds minus government AAA
bonds. Since the series is shorter than the sample period, the charts refer to the period 1996Q1-
2008Q3 only. The SWBGG model generates a series of the spread rather constant over time, while
the SWGK model better replicates the business cycle ﬂuctuations of this variable. Recalling that,
in the estimation, the standard dataset of macroeconomic variables do not include ﬁnancial data,
the SWGK model produces cyclical ﬂuctuations of the ﬁnancial variable that are closer to those in
the data to a certain extent.
9Theoretical moments are computed from the state-space representation for 1, 000 random draws from the posterior
distributions  which produce 1, 000 sets of theoretical moments. Data are linearly detrended.
10Since the models fail in replicating the relative standard deviations of interest rate and  to a minor extent  of
inﬂation, there could be some doubt on the overall ability of the models to ﬁt the data. As a robustness check, the
models are then estimated allowing for measurement errors in inﬂation and wages, as well as for a moving-average
component in the price and wage mark up shocks. In such a case there is indeed an improvement in the ability of the
models in replicating the relative standard deviation of inﬂation and, to a minor extent, the nominal interest rate.
The log data density reveals that the ranking of the re-estimated models is not aﬀected and the SWGK model is still
the preferred one. Details are available in the online Appendix C. An alternative way to improve the relative standard
deviations of inﬂation and interest rate could be to include innovations to trend inﬂation in the NK Phillips curve as
suggested by Cogley and Sbordone (2008).
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Figure 2 reports the models-implied spread, in percent deviations from their steady state values,
within a 95% conﬁdence band, along with the percent deviations from HP(1600) trends of proxies
of spreads in US data (available in the ALFRED database of the St' Louis Fed). Due to the greater
availability of US data on spreads, two measures of spreads are reported in the ﬁgure: Moody's
seasoned Baa corporate bond yield (Baa) minus Moody's seasoned Aaa corporate bond yield (Aaa);
and Baa minus long-term Treasury constant maturity rate (TCM). While the SWBGG generates a
series of the spread more correlated with the latter proxy, the SWGK model replicates a series of
the spread more correlated with the ﬁrst proxy. Both models generate a series of the spread: (i)
with a comparable order of magnitude of the available proxies; and (ii) with an upward trend at the
end of the sample, picking-up the end-of-sample crisis.
4.3 Impulse response functions and variance decomposition
This section discusses the impulse response functions (IRFs) and variance decomposition of the
two models for the two economies in order explain why the presence of ﬁnancial frictions on FI is
empirically favored by the data. This section shows the eﬀects on output, investment, inﬂation,
net worth of ﬁrms in the SWBGG model and of FI in the SWGK model, and spread to all the
seven structural shocks: capital quality (KQ), monetary policy (MP), government spending (Gov),
investment-speciﬁc technology (IS), technology (TFP), price mark-up (PMU) and wage mark-up
(WMU) shocks. All the shocks are set to produce a downturn. In all the ﬁgures, impulse responses
are normalized so that the size of each shock is the same across the models. The solid lines represent
the estimated median and the dotted lines represent the 95% conﬁdence intervals.
The two models embed a diﬀerent transmission mechanism: while in the SWBGG model the
ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect works through the ﬁrms' balance sheet channel, in the SWGK model
it works through the bank lending channel. And the dynamics of net worth is diﬀerently aﬀected
by a change in the spread in the two models. Generally speaking, the equations describing the
accumulation of net worth of ﬁrms and banks  16a and 20b, respectively, in Table 1  are similar.
Both equations contain a term for net worth of the previous period, the leverage, the rate of return
on capital and the risk free rate. However, the eﬀect of any exogenous shock on net worth of ﬁrms
is dramatically diﬀerent from the eﬀects of the same shock on net worth of FI. As explained by
Villa and Yang (2011), three factors aﬀect the proﬁts of FI: the lending volume, the spread and
the leverage. Any contractionary shock aﬀects bank's proﬁts either directly or indirectly. The
FI decides about the amount of corporate bonds it holds subject to the incentive constraint, the
expected capital return, and the deposit return. A fall in the asset price leads to a deterioration of
FI balance sheets. The reduction in net worth makes the incentive constraint tighter, leading to a
higher spread and, hence, proﬁts. The resulting rise of the spread has also the eﬀect of reducing the
demand for loans by ﬁrms, leading to a further contraction in investment and, hence, output. This
is the essence of the ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect of the SWGK model. The increase in the spread after
a negative shock helps ﬁnancial intermediaries to rebuild faster their net worth. On the contrary,
in the SWBGG model the rise in the spread causes a further fall in net worth. Hence optimizing
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ﬁnancial intermediaries beneﬁt from a rise in the spread. In most shocks the rise in the spread is
indeed stronger in the SWGK model. But this causes a more pronounced fall in investment and,
hence, output. The SWGK model provides a better solution to the so-called small shocks, large
cycles puzzle (Bernanke et al., 1996).
For all the shocks estimated for the Euro Area, but the investment-speciﬁc technology and the
price mark up shocks, the ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect embedded in the SWGK model is indeed
ampliﬁed compared to that in the SWBGG model as shown by Figures 3 and 4. The propagation
mechanism of the capital quality shock  which is the main driver of GDP at all horizons, as shown
in Table 7  is as follows. In the SWBGG model the capital quality shock aﬀects only the demand
side of the credit market through two main mechanisms: (1) due to the simulated recession, there is
a fall in asset prices and the return on capital, causing a downward shift in the demand for capital;
(2) the fall in net worth due to the reduction in the return on capital, of capital and the price
of capital, causes an increase in leverage. This leads to a rise in the spread, and hence a further
fall in investment. The fall in net worth is persistent, since this variable is well below steady state
after 20 quarters. In the SWGK a capital quality shock directly translates into a shock to bank's
balance sheet due to the identity between capital and assets. Due to the presence of moral hazard,
depositors require banks not to be overleveraged. Hence they are forced to reduce lending. The
reduction in the lending volume makes the incentive constraint tighter, leading to a higher spread
and, hence, to a higher proﬁtability. Compared to the SWBGG model the increase of the spread
from its steady state is much larger. On one hand, net worth tends to rise back to its steady state.
On the other, non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms observe a rise in borrowing costs and consequently reduce their
demand of capital. The fall in investment is indeed much more pronounced in the SWGK model.
A contractionary monetary policy shock is shown in the third and fourth row of Figure 3. While
the sign of the impact responses are similar among the models, the transmission mechanism is dif-
ferent. In both models an increase in the nominal interest rate reduces investment and, therefore,
output. Demand downward pressures feed through changes in the output gap to inﬂation. This
causes a downward shift in aggregate demand, which reduces inﬂation on impact. This standard
transmission mechanism of the monetary policy shock is enhanced through its impact on credit
markets. In the SWBGG model the decline in the price of capital due to the tightening of monetary
policy causes a fall in net worth of intermediate goods ﬁrms. This implies that the potential diver-
gence of interests between ﬁrms and lenders is greater and, therefore, agency costs increase. As a
result, the rise in the spread further reinforces the simulated contraction in capital and investment.
In the SWGK model, due to the retrenchment in investment, loans decrease as well. At the same
time the fall in asset prices worsen FI's balance sheet. The deterioration in intermediary balance
sheets pushes up the spread. The increase in ﬁnancing costs causes a further decline in loans and
investment.
The contractionary government spending shock leads to a positive wealth eﬀect, leading to a
crowding-out eﬀect on consumption and investment. As evident from Table 7 this shock plays a
marginal role in aﬀecting all the variables at any horizon.
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A more detailed explanation is needed for the investment-speciﬁc technology shock, depicted in
the last two rows of Figure 3. This shock causes a rise in the price of capital, Qt, which has two
opposite eﬀects in the SWBGG model as also explained by Kamber et al. (2012): (i) investment falls
as well as output; and (ii) net worth of ﬁrms increases due to the higher return on capital, equation
(16a) in Table 1. The latter eﬀect causes a fall in the spread. This in turn determines an increase
in investment. This latter eﬀect dominates in the estimated model and investment rises. Hence this
shock does not replicate the positive comovement between output and investment, at least on impact.
Moreover, it accounts for most of the forecast error variance of investment at longer horizons, as
evident from Table 7. This result can explain why both the SWBGG and SWGK models fail to
replicate the cross-correlation of investment with output reported in Table 6. In addition, contrary
to empirical evidence (e.g. Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero, 2011; Agénor et al., 2014), this shock causes
a procyclical response of the spread. This result is particularly interesting when combined with
the variance decomposition analysis. The investment-speciﬁc technology shock explains 73% of the
unconditional variance decomposition of the spread in the SWBGG model, and more than 80% of
the variance decomposition of the spread at longer horizons. Hence, it could be argued that in
this model investment and the spread, important variables in explaining the ﬁnancial accelerator
mechanism, are explained by a counterintuitive shock. In the SWGK model, an investment-speciﬁc
technology shock exerts three main eﬀects: (i) the price of capital rises, causing a fall in investment
and output; (ii) the retrenchment in investment leads to a lower demand for lending, aﬀecting in
turn bank's proﬁts; and (iii) net worth of FI rises because of the higher return on capital, equation
(20b) in Table 1. The ﬁrst two eﬀects acts in the direction of reducing investment, while the
latter eﬀect  which turns out to be quantitatively more important  leads to a rise in investment.
Overall, the contractionary eﬀect in output prevails. Similarly to the SWBGG model, the spread
falls. Table 7 shows that investment-speciﬁc technology shock explains 17% of the unconditional
variance decomposition of the spread and even lower fractions at diﬀerent horizons. And this shock,
although it is the main driver of investment ﬂuctuations in particular at longer horizons, explains a
lower fraction of its ﬂuctuations compared to the SWBGG model. This diﬀerence is evident at all
the horizons. The minor importance of the investment-speciﬁc technology shock  in particular on
investment and on the spread  provides some explanation on the better ﬁt of the SWGK model
reported in the previous section.
The technology shock, shown in Figure 4, has a direct impact on output by making factors less
productive, and leads to an increase in prices due to the contraction in aggregate supply. Investment
and consumption decline due to the contraction in output. In the SWBGG model the lower return
on capital and the decrease in the price of capital aﬀects net worth of ﬁrms, which decreases. There
is a moderate rise of the spread, which contributes to the fall in investment. In the SWGK model
the decrease in asset prices also worsens the FI's balance sheet. Such a deterioration leads to an
increase in the spread, and hence in proﬁts. This makes it possible to net worth to come back to
steady state faster compared to the SWBGG model. The higher borrowing costs discourages the
demand for it, leading to a further and a more pronounced retrenchment in investment.
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A positive price mark-up shock exerts a contractionary eﬀect on real activity leading to a decline
in output, investment and consumption. The inﬂation rate increases and, since the Taylor rule is
operating, this leads to a rise in the nominal interest rate. This shock tends to reduce both the
return on and the price of capital. Hence, net worth of ﬁrms in the SWBGG model and of FI in
the SWGK model falls. The role of the price mark-up shock in explaining variations in real and
ﬁnancial variables is very limited for both models, as shown by Table 7. Similar argument applies
to the wage mark-up shock: it leads to an increase in the prices of factors for production, causing
a fall in their equilibrium quantity. This exerts a contractionary eﬀect on output, as shown by the
last two rows of Figure 4. The rise in prices is accompanied by a rise in the nominal interest rate.
Diﬀerently from the price mark-up shock the wage rises. This causes an increase in the marginal
product of capital, Zk, as also evident from equation (8) in Table 1. This, in turn, leads to a
temporary rise in the return on capital and, hence, in net worth both in the SWBGG and SWGK
models. In the former, the rise in net worth and the fall in leverage explains the pro-cyclical response
of the spread, which falls as in Gelain (2010). In the SWGK model, instead, the spread exhibits a
counter-cyclical behavior. Similarly to the price mark-up, the wage mark-up shock plays a marginal
role in accounting for ﬂuctuations in real and ﬁnancial variables.
The impulse responses estimated for the United States, Figures 5 and 6, replicate transmission
mechanisms similar to the ones observed in the Euro Area. However, the ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect
on output of the monetary policy shock is slightly larger in the SWBGG model compared to that
in the SWGK model. There are two explanations for this result: ﬁrst, the larger persistence of the
monetary policy shock, equal to 0.27 in the SWBGG model and to 0.23 in the SWGK model; and,
second, the diﬀerent ﬁnancial structures of the two areas. In the Euro Area the main fraction of
external ﬁnance of corporate sector is constituted by bank loans. Hence, a monetary policy shock
transmitted through the bank lending channel has a stronger impact on real activity in the EA than
in the US where the corporate sector has access to markets in addition to ﬁnancial intermediaries
(e.g. Ciccarelli et al., 2013). The analysis of the variance decomposition points to results similar to
the Euro Area: the investment-speciﬁc technology shock accounts for more than 60% of the forecast
error variance of the spread in the SWBGG model, while it accounts for 16% of the variance of the
spread in the SWGK model. The same shock is the main driver of investment in the SWBGG model
 both in terms of unconditional variance decomposition and at longer horizons. In the SWGK
model, instead, the capital quality shock is the main driver of investment. As evident from impulse
responses, the investment-speciﬁc technology shock features a pro-cyclical behavior of the spread
and a counter-cyclical behavior of investment, contrary to the empirical evidence. Hence, its larger
role in the SWBGG model could explain the better ﬁt of the SWGK model also for the US economy.
Overall, two main factors could provide some explanations on the better ﬁt of the SWGK model.
First, ﬁnancial intermediaries provide a more powerful endogenous mechanism of ampliﬁcation due
to the more pronounced eﬀect on the spread after a contractionary shock. And second, the important
role of investment-speciﬁc technology shock in explaining investment and the spread in the SWBGG
model is likely to explain the lower ﬁt of the model itself.
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4.4 Forecasting accuracy
This subsection evaluates the two models from a forecasting viewpoint. Following Kolasa et al.
(2012), Bekiros and Paccagnini (2014a) and Bekiros and Paccagnini (2014b), the out-of-sample
forecast performance is based on four horizons  ranging from one up to four quarters ahead. The
recursive forecasting estimation considers the evaluation period from 2001Q1 to 2007Q4 (with 28
forecast periods in the last recursived sample). The root mean squared forecast error (RMSFE) is
used to evaluate point forecasts. In particular, RMSFEs are computed based on recursive estimation
sample starting from 1983Q1-2000Q4 and ending in 1983Q1-2007Q4 (h = 1), 1983Q1-2007Q3 (h =
2), 1983Q1-2007Q2 (h = 3) and 1983Q1-2007Q1 (h = 4), respectively.
Table 9 reports the RMSFEs for the two models and the two economies for the following variables:
GDP growth, investment growth, inﬂation and the nominal interest rate. As far as the EA is
concerned, the accuracy of output growth forecasts from the SWGK model is signiﬁcantly higher
than that from the SWBGG model at all horizons. A similar result also holds for forecasts of
investment growth, where the forecasting accuracy of the SWGK model is even higher in percentage
terms compared to that of GDP growth. For inﬂation forecasts results are mixed although the
diﬀerence is not very pronounced: the RMSFEs from the SWBGG model are lower in the ﬁrst and
second horizons, while for the other horizons the RMSFEs from the SWGK model are lower. The
SWGK model performs better in terms of forecasting the nominal interest rate. Overall, the SWGK
model outperforms the SWBGG model in forecasting real as well as nominal variables, which the
exception of shorter horizon forecasts of inﬂation.
In the United States there is no clear evidence of an outperformed model in terms of forecasting
accuracy. The values of the RMSFEs are remarkably similar across the two models. The RMSFEs
for GDP growth are lower in the SWBGG model at shorter horizons and in the SWGK model at
longer horizons. Results are mixed also for the RMSFEs for investment growth, while inﬂation
forecasts are better in the SWGK model at all horizons. For the nominal interest rate RMSFEs
from the two models almost coincide.
5 Conclusion
Since the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis the link between ﬁnancial intermediation and real activity has
received an increasing attention both in academia and in policy institutions. This paper provides
an empirical comparison of DSGE models which have a Smets and Wouters (2007) economy in
common but feature diﬀerent types of ﬁnancial frictions: the SWBGG model with ﬁnancial frictions
originating in intermediate goods ﬁrms due to a costly state veriﬁcation problem à la Bernanke et
al. (1999); and the SWGK model with ﬁnancial frictions embedded in ﬁnancial intermediaries due
to a moral hazard problem à la Gertler and Karadi (2011). The main result is that the SWGK
model is always favored both by EA and US data. The reasons for the better empirical performance
of the SWGK are mainly two: ﬁrst, impulse response function analysis reveals that the presence
of the banking sector acts as a powerful ampliﬁcation channel of the shocks hitting the economy.
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This is caused by the diﬀerent eﬀect that a change in the spread causes on the relevant net worth in
the models. As a result, the ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect embedded in the SWGK model is stronger
than that in the SWBGG model. Second, the investment-speciﬁc technology shock plays a diﬀerent
role in the two models, both in the EA and the US. In particular, it explains a larger fractions of
the dynamics of the spread and investment in the SWBGG model compared to those in the SWGK
model. However, this shock does not replicate the comovement between output and investment and
the countercyclical behavior of the spread. Hence, its larger role in the SWBGG model provides
another reasons for the better empirical performance of the SWGK model. This paper also ﬁnds
that introducing frictions aﬀecting the banking sector tends to improve the quality of point forecasts
of GDP growth, investment growth and the nominal interest rate in the EA. In the United States,
instead, no model clearly dominates the other in terms of forecasting accuracy and the root mean
squared forecast errors are remarkably similar across the two models.
The results presented in this paper oﬀer some avenues for future research. First, it would be
interesting to analyze a model featuring both types of ﬁnancial frictions, at ﬁrms level and in the
banking sector, in order to examine the transmission mechanism of the shocks and the accelera-
tor/attenuator eﬀects. And second, such a model could also incorporate the same form of ﬁnancial
friction (costly state veriﬁcation or moral hazard at both levels) in order to empirically verify which
modelling device is preferred by the data. DSGE models with a comprehensive structure of ﬁnancial
markets would improve our understanding of business cycle ﬂuctuations.
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(13a) Price of capital Rˆkt =
Zk
Rk
Zˆkt +
(1−δ)
Rk
(
Qˆt + ε
k
t
)
− Qˆt−1
(14a) External ﬁnance premium EˆP t = κ
(
Qˆt + Et
[
Kˆt+1
]
− Et
[
Nˆt+1
])
(15a) Spread Et
[
Rˆkt+1
]
= Rˆt + EˆP t
(16a) Firms' net worth accumulation 1
θRk
Et
[
Nˆt+1
]
= K
N
Rˆkt −
(
K
N
− 1) Rˆt−1 − κ (KN − 1) (Kˆt + Qˆt−1)
+
[(
K
N
− 1)κ + 1] Nˆt
SWGK model: equations (1)(12) + (13a) +
(14b) Gain from expanding assets Vˆt =
(1−θ)β
V
[Rk −R]Et
[
Λˆt,t+1
]
+ (1−θ)β
V
[
RkEt
[
Rˆkt+1
]
−RRˆt
]
+θβXEt[Xˆt,t+1 + Vˆt+1 + Λˆt,t+1]
(15b) Value of expanding net worth Dˆt = θβZEt[Λˆt,t+1 + Zˆt,t+1 + Dˆt+1]
(16b) Gross growth rate of net worth Zˆt,t+1 =
1
Z
[
levRkEt
[
Rˆkt+1
]
+R(1− lev)Rˆt + (Rk −R)lev ˆlevt
]
(17b) Gross growth rate in assets Xˆt,t+1 = Et
[
ˆlevt+1
]
+ Zˆt,t+1 − ˆlevt
(18b) Leverage ˆlevt = Dˆt +
V
λ−V Vˆt
(19b) FI constraint Kˆt+1 + Qˆt = ˆlevt + Nˆt
(20b) Net worth of existing FI Nˆet = Nˆt−1 +
1
Z
[
levRkEt
[
Rˆkt+1
]
+R(1− lev)Rˆt + (Rk −R)lev ˆlevt
]
(21b) Net worth of new FI Nˆnt = Qˆt + Kˆt
(22b) Total net worth Nˆt =
Ne
Y
Y
N
Nˆet +
Nn
Y
Y
N
Nˆnt
(23b) Spread EˆP t = Et
[
Rˆkt+1
]
− Rˆt
Variables with a `hat' denote a percentage deviation from steady state, while a variable without a time subscript
denotes its steady-state value. The term Yˆ pt represents the level of output that would prevail under ﬂexible prices
and wages without the two mark-up shocks; Eˆt is employment; Λˆt,t+1 = ˆmut+1 − mˆut; mˆut = 11−h
(
hCˆt−1 − Cˆt
)
.
Table 1: Linearized models equations
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Parameter Value
β, discount factor 0.99
α, capital income share 0.33
δ, depreciation rate 0.025
G
Y , government spending to GDP ratio 0.20
ε, elasticity of substitution in good market set to target M = 1.20
εw, elasticity of substitution in labor market set to target Mw = 1.20
Table 2: Calibration of parameters common to both models
Financial Parameters SWBGG model SWGK model
θ, survival rate 0.972 0.972
S, steady state spread 150 basis point py 150 basis point py
K
N , leverage ratio 2 4
χ, fraction of assets given to the new bankers  0.001
λ, fraction of divertable assets  0.515
Table 3: Calibration of model-speciﬁc parameters
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Euro Area United States
SW SWBGG SWGK SW SWBGG SWGK
Log data density −365.86761 −357.26933 −344.74334 −548.12333 −545.60391 −539.27695
Comparison between SW and SWBGG & SWGK
Bayes factor  5.4× 103 1.5× 109  12 6.9× 103
Comparison between SWBGG and SWGK
Bayes factor   2.8× 105   5.6× 102
Table 5: Models comparisons
Euro Area United States
Data SWBGG SWGK Data SWBGG SWGK
Relative standard deviations to output
Output 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Investment 2.44 2.92 [1.79;3.89] 2.88 [1.74;3.55] 4.06 3.78 [2.51;4.89] 3.93 [3.03;4.65]
Consumption 1.27 1.63 [0.51;2.50] 1.46 [0.62;2.31] 1.00 1.59 [0.67;2.33] 1.44 [0.72;1.89]
Inﬂation 0.18 0.07 [0.06;0.08] 0.08 [0.07;0.08] 0.11 0.05 [0.04;0.06] 0.06 [0.05;0.07]
Interest rate 0.25 0.07 [0.06;0.08] 0.08 [0.07;0.08] 0.20 0.09 [0.07;0.11] 0.09 [0.07;0.10]
Cross-correlations with output
Investment 0.75 0.20 [-0.07;0.42] 0.37 [0.33;0.43] 0.64 0.48 [0.41;0.53] 0.60 [0.55;0.66]
Consumption 0.92 0.75 [0.58;0.92] 0.82 [0.71;0.93] 0.93 0.77 [0.63;0.88] 0.84 [0.75;0.92]
Inﬂation -0.29 -0.25 [-0.64;-0.01] -0.27 [-0.53;-0.04] -0.15 -0.32 [-0.77;-0.01] -0.28 [-0.58;-0.03]
Interest rate 0.24 0.14 [0.05;0.29] 0.17 [0.05;0.34] 0.26 0.14 [0.1;0.29] 0.13 [0.03;0.27]
Autocorrelations of order 1
Output 0.93 0.98 [0.95;0.99] 0.98 [0.95;0.99] 0.87 0.98 [0.95;0.99] 0.98 [0.95;0.99]
Investment 0.95 0.99 [0.97;1.00] 0.99 [0.96;0.99] 0.96 0.99 [0.97;0.99] 0.98 [0.96;0.99]
Consumption 0.94 0.98 [0.96;1.00] 0.98 [0.96;1.00] 0.89 0.93 [0.89;1.00] 0.94 [0.90;0.99]
Inﬂation 0.54 0.86 [0.80;0.91] 0.79 [0.74;0.85] 0.50 0.85 [0.75;0.98] 0.75 [0.65;0.84]
Interest rate 0.94 0.96 [0.94;0.99] 0.96 [0.94;0.99] 0.95 0.96 [0.95;0.98] 0.96 [0.95;0.98]
Table 6: Moments in the data versus the models
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Horizon Structural shocks
TFP Gov. Mon. Invest. Capital Wage Price
spending policy speciﬁc Quality mark-up mark-up
Output 1 19.4; 29.1 15.3; 12.2 11.1; 13.6 1.5; 4.2 48.8; 37.9 0.5; 0.5 3.4; 2.6
4 27.7; 37.1 2.8; 1.9 8.9; 11.1 0.5; 2.4 52.1; 41.9 1.9; 1.6 6.2; 4.0
8 27.7; 37.6 1.1; 0.7 6.2; 8.3 0.2; 1.4 55.1; 45.7 3.1; 2.6 6.6; 3.6
20 18.4; 29.7 0.5; 0.3 3.4; 5.2 0.6; 0.9 70.8; 59.3 2.6; 2.7 3.7; 2.0
40 11.4; 20.7 0.3; 0.2 2.2; 3.5 1.2; 1.3 81.1; 71.1 1.6; 1.9 2.3; 1.3
uncon. 7.8; 12.6 0.2; 0.1 1.5; 2.2 1.5; 2.1 86.3; 81.1 1.1; 1.1 1.5; 0.8
Investment 1 12.1; 23.5 0.0; 0.2 8.4; 11.0 24.1; 10.3 51.0; 52.1 0.1; 0.2 4.3; 2.6
4 13.0; 23.5 0.0; 0.2 6.4; 9.2 32.3; 15.8 42.9; 48.2 0.4; 0.5 5.0; 2.5
8 11.6; 21.8 0.0; 0.2 4.6; 7.4 44.5; 24.7 34.4; 43.2 0.6; 0.7 4.3; 2.0
20 5.6; 14.0 0.0; 0.1 2.2; 4.2 73.2; 52.1 16.8; 28.0 0.4; 0.6 1.8; 0.9
40 3.2; 9.1 0.0; 0.1 1.2; 2.8 79.1; 67.6 15.1; 19.4 0.3; 0.4 1.1; 0.6
uncon. 2.0; 6.9 0.0; 0.1 0.7; 2.1 77.7; 65.4 18.7; 24.9 0.2; 0.3 0.7;0.5
Spread 1 0.3; 44.8 0.0; 0.7 4.4; 8.0 66.9; 1.1 27.6; 30.1 0.9; 2.1 0.0; 13.3
4 0.1; 38.3 0.0; 0.6 3.8; 6.8 72.2; 2.1 22.9; 41.9 1.0; 2.6 0.0; 7.8
8 0.2; 31.6 0.0; 0.5 3.2; 7.3 77.4; 4.4 17.9; 48.3 1.3; 2.0 0.1; 5.9
20 0.8; 25.7 0.1; 0.4 2.3; 7.5 85.3; 12.1 9.7; 47.2 1.7; 2.2 0.1; 4.9
40 1.1; 24.5 0.1; 0.4 1.7; 7.1 85.4; 16.3 10.0; 44.8 1.7; 2.4 0.1; 4.6
uncon. 0.9; 24.3 0.1; 0.4 1.3; 7.0 73.1; 17.0 23.4; 44.4 1.3; 2.3 0.1; 4.6
Table 7: Variance decomposition for the Euro Area. The ﬁrst number refers to the SWBGG model
while the second to the SWGK model
Horizon Structural shocks
TFP Gov. Mon. Invest. Capital Wage Price
spending policy speciﬁc Quality mark-up mark-up
Output 1 9.7; 12.4 27.3; 25.2 13.2; 14.4 0.0; 3.0 47.1; 41.7 0.0; 0.0 2.6; 3.4
4 12.8; 15.9 6.2; 5.0 11.4; 11.7 1.4; 1.0 64.5; 61.4 0.2; 0.6 3.6; 4.4
8 11.3; 14.5 2.7; 1.9 7.7; 7.8 3.4; 0.4 72.4; 71.5 0.4; 1.3 2.1; 2.6
20 7.5; 9.9 1.2; 0.6 4.0; 3.8 5.8; 0.1 80.5; 83.3 0.3; 1.4 0.8; 0.9
40 5.5; 6.4 0.9; 0.4 2.9; 2.3 6.3; 0.4 83.6; 89.2 0.3; 0.9 0.5; 0.5
uncon. 4.9;4.0 0.9;0.2 2.6;1.4 6.1; 1.4 84.8; 92.1 0.2; 0.6 0.5;0.3
Investment 1 2.9; 6.7 0.1; 0.9 8.5; 8.1 34.8; 11.5 52.2; 71.2 0.8; 0.0 0.8; 1.6
4 3.1; 7.1 0.1; 0.9 7.4; 7.0 39.5; 13.7 48.8; 70.0 0.5; 0.1 0.7; 1.3
8 3.1; 7.3 0.1; 0.9 6.2; 5.9 45.9; 16.9 44.0; 68.0 0.3; 0.2 0.5; 0.9
20 2.5; 6.5 0.0; 0.7 4.4; 4.1 62.6; 28.6 30.0; 59.4 0.2; 0.4 0.2; 0.5
40 1.9; 5.2 0.0; 0.6 3.2; 3.2 61.8; 42.7 32.7; 47.8 0.2; 0.3 0.2; 0.4
uncon. 1.4; 3.4 0.0; 0.4 2.4; 2.1 58.7; 40.9 37.2; 52.8 0.2; 0.2 0.1;0.3
Spread 1 0.6; 8.2 0.0; 1.8 5.9; 5.5 52.4; 11.7 39.4; 47.4 1.7; 0.9 0.1; 24.5
4 0.5; 7.7 0.0; 1.7 5.5; 4.7 56.5; 10.8 35.6; 64.6 1.9; 0.9 0.1; 9.6
8 0.3; 6.8 0.0; 1.5 5.1; 5.0 61.4; 11.5 30.9; 68.3 2.1; 0.6 0.1; 6.3
20 0.3; 5.9 0.1; 1.3 4.4; 5.1 69.5; 14.8 22.8; 67.0 2.7; 0.8 0.2; 5.1
40 0.5; 6.0 0.3; 1.3 3.8; 4.9 67.5; 15.8 25.2; 66.1 2.6; 1.0 0.1; 4.9
uncon. 0.5; 5.9 0.3; 1.3 3.5; 4.8 63.4; 15.9 29.8; 66.1 2.5; 1.0 0.1; 4.9
Table 8: Variance decomposition for the United States. The ﬁrst number refers to the SWBGG
model while the second to the SWGK model
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Euro Area SWBGG SWGK
horizon 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
GDP growth 0.93 0.78 0.90 0.91 0.71 0.67 0.72 0.67
Investment growth 2.54 2.17 2.20 2.13 1.44 1.55 1.49 1.40
Inﬂation (GDP price index) 0.73 0.68 0.66 0.60 0.81 0.72 0.65 0.57
Nominal interest rate 1.58 1.53 1.48 1.45 1.57 1.50 1.42 1.35
United States SWBGG SWGK
horizon 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
GDP growth 0.91 0.90 0.85 0.73 0.94 0.93 0.83 0.73
Investment growth 2.26 2.25 2.04 1.62 2.41 2.24 2.06 1.56
Inﬂation (GDP price index) 0.34 0.40 0.43 0.42 0.33 0.38 0.42 0.41
Nominal interest rate 1.38 1.31 1.26 1.23 1.37 1.31 1.27 1.22
Table 9: Root mean squared forecast errors of unconditional forecasts.
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Figure 1: Model implied spread versus EA data (percent deviations from steady stateand HP(1600)
trend, respectively); data are extracted from the ECB.
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Figure 2: Model implied spread versus US data (percent deviations from steady state and HP(1600)
trend, respectively); data are extracted from the ALFRED database of the St. Louis Fed.
23
5 10 15 20
−6
−2
GDP
SW
BG
G
−K
Q
5 10 15 20
−14
−9
Investment
5 10 15 20
−0.4
0.2
Inflation
5 10 15 20
−17
−12
Net worth
5 10 15 20
0
0.2
Spread
5 10 15 20
−8
−4
SW
G
K−
KQ
5 10 15 20
−20
−10
5 10 15 20
−0.5
0.2
5 10 15 20
−50
−13
5 10 15 20
0.2
1
5 10 15 20
−4
−2
SW
BG
G
−M
P
5 10 15 20
−12
−6
5 10 15 20
−0.6
0
5 10 15 20
−14
−4
5 10 15 20
0.05
0.2
5 10 15 20
−5
−1
SW
G
K−
M
P
5 10 15 20
−16
−5
5 10 15 20
−0.6
0
5 10 15 20
−36
−5
5 10 15 20
0.2
0.8
5 10 15 20
−0.2
0
SW
BG
G
−G
ov
5 10 15 20
0
0.1
5 10 15 20
−0.01
0
5 10 15 20
−0.06
0
5 10 15 20
0.5
2.5
x 10−3
5 10 15 20
−0.18
0
SW
G
K−
G
ov
5 10 15 20
0
0.2
5 10 15 20
−0.01
0
5 10 15 20
−0.1
0.2
5 10 15 20
−15
0
x 10−3
5 10 15 20
−0.1
0.1
SW
BG
G
−I
S
5 10 15 20
0.5
2
5 10 15 20
0
0.03
5 10 15 20
1
2.5
5 10 15 20
−0.04
−0.02
5 10 15 20
−0.2
0
SW
G
K−
IS
5 10 15 20
0.5
1.5
5 10 15 20
0
0.03
5 10 15 20
2
4
5 10 15 20
−0.03
0.01
Figure 3: EA estimated impulse responses to the following shocks: capital quality (KQ), monetary
policy (MP), government spending (Gov), and investment-speciﬁc technology (IS) in the SWBGG
and SWGK models. Solid lines represent mean IRF and dashed line represent the 95% conﬁdence
intervals. The size of the shocks is normalized to one standard deviation.
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Figure 4: EA estimated impulse responses to the following shocks: TFP, price mark-up (PMU)
and wage mark-up (WMU) in the SWBGG and SWGK models. Solid lines represent mean IRF
and dashed line represent the 95% conﬁdence intervals. The size of the shocks is normalized to one
standard deviation.
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Figure 5: US Demand shocks: capital quality (KQ), monetary policy (MP), government spending
(Gov). Solid lines represent mean IRF and dashed line represent the 95% conﬁdence intervals. The
size of the shocks is normalized to one standard deviation.
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Figure 6: US Supply shocks: TFP, price mark-up (PMU) and wage mark-up (WMU). Solid lines
represent mean IRF and dashed line represent the 95% conﬁdence intervals. The size of the shocks
is normalized to one standard deviation.
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Appendix
A The Models
This section presents the three DSGE models. Subsection A.1 presents the core Smets and Wouters
(SW) model. Subsection A.2 presents the optimization problems in the SWBGG that are diﬀerent
from the ones in the SW model. Subsection A.3 shows the analytical aspects which are peculiar to
the SWGK model.
A.1 The core SW model
A.1.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of households indexed by j ∈ (0, 1). Following Gertler and
Karadi (2011), each household's preferences are represented by the following intertemporal utility
function,11
Ut (·) = ln (Ct − hCt−1)− L
1+φ
t
1 + φ
(3)
where hmeasures the degree of superﬁcial external habits in consumption, Lt is labor supply in terms
of hours worked and φ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The representative
household enters period t with real government bonds, that pay the gross real interest rate, Rt,
between t − 1 and t. During period t, each household chooses to consume Ct; supplies Lt hours
of work; and allocates savings in government bonds, Bt+1. Each household gains an hourly real
wage, W ht /Pt; and dividend payments, Πt, from ﬁrms. The government grants transfers TRt and
imposes real lump-sum taxes Tt. In addition, each household owns the capital stock which she rents
to intermediate goods ﬁrms at a real gross rental rate RHt . As explained by Smets and Wouters
(2003), the supply of rental services from capital can be risen either by investing, It, or by changing
the utilization rate of installed capital, Ut. The law of motion of capital, Kt, is equal to
Kt+1 = (1− δ)ektKt + xt
[
1−z
(
It
It−1
)]
It (4)
where δ stands for depreciation and ekt is the capital quality shock, as in Gertler and Karadi (2011),
which is meant to capture exogenous variation in the value of capital due to economic obsolescence.
The adjustment cost function z satisﬁes the following properties: z(1) = z′(1) = 0, and z′′(1) =
ξ > 0. The shock to the marginal eﬃciency of investment, xt, follows an AR(1) process, ρx is
an autoregressive coeﬃcient and εxt is a serially uncorrelated, normally distributed shock with zero
mean and standard deviation σx. This shock varies the eﬃciency with which the ﬁnal good can be
transformed into physical capital.
11All households choose the same allocation in equilibrium; hence, for sake of notation, the j index is dropped.
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The budget constraint is as follows:
Ct + It +
Bt
Rt
≤ W
h
t
Pt
Lt +Bt−1 +RHt UtKt−1 −Ψ(Ut)Kt−1 + Πt + TRt − Tt (5)
where Ψ(Ut) represents the costs of changing capital utilization, with ζ = Ψ′′(Ut)/Ψ′(Ut). Maxi-
mization of equation (3) subject to (4) and (5) yields the following ﬁrst-order conditions with respect
to Ct, Bt+1, Lt, It, Kt and Ut:
UCt = mut (6)
βRtEt[mut+1] = mut (7)
−ULt = mutW
h
t
Pt
⇔ ULt
UCt
= −MRSt ≡ −W
h
t
Pt
(8)
mut = mu
k
t xt
[
1−z
(
It
It−1
)
−z′
(
It
It−1
)(
It
It−1
)]
+ βEt
[
mukt+1xt+1z′
(
It+1
It
)(
It+1
It
)2]
(9)
mukt = βEt
[
mut+1
(
RHt+1Ut+1 −Ψ(Ut)
)
+ (1− δ)ekt+1mukt+1
]
(10)
RHt = Ψ
′(Ut) (11)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, mut is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget
constraint and let Λt,t+1 ≡ mut+1mut . And mukt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with capital
accumulation equation. The Tobin's Q is the ratio of the two multipliers, i.e. Qt =
mukt
mut
.
A.1.2 The labor market
Households supply homogeneous labor to monopolistic labor unions which diﬀerentiate it. Labor
service used by intermediate goods ﬁrms is a composite of diﬀerentiated types of labor indexed by
l ∈ (0, 1)
Lt =
[ˆ 1
0
Lt (l)
εw−1
εw dl
] εw
εw−1
(12)
where εw is the elasticity of substitution across diﬀerent types of labor. Labor packers solve the
problem of choosing the varieties of labor to minimize the cost of producing a given amount of the
aggregate labor index, taking each nominal wage rate Wt(l) as given:
min
Lt(l)
ˆ 1
0
Wt (l)Lt (l) dl (13)
s.t.
[ˆ 1
0
Lt (l)
εw−1
εw dl
] εw
εw−1
> L¯ (14)
The demand for labor is given by
Lt (l) =
(
Wt (l)
Wt
)−εw
Lt (15)
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where Wt is the aggregate wage index. Equations (15) and (12) imply
Wt =
[ˆ 1
0
Wt (l)
1−εw dl
] 1
1−εw
(16)
Labor unions adjust wages infrequently following the Calvo scheme. Let σw be the probability of
keeping wages constant and (1−σw) the probability of changing wages. In other words, each period
there is a constant probability (1 − σw) that the union is able to adjust the wage, independently
of past history. This implies that the fraction of unions setting wages at t is (1 − σw). For the
other fraction that cannot adjust, the wage is automatically increased at the aggregate inﬂation
rate. The wage for non-optimizing unions evolves according to the following trajectory W ∗t (l),
W ∗t (l)
(
Pt
Pt−1
)σwi
, W ∗t (l)
(
Pt+1
Pt−1
)σwi
, ..., where σwi denotes the degree of wage indexation.
The union chooses W ∗t to maximize
Et
∞∑
s=0
Λt,t+s (βσw)
s Lt+s(l)
[
W ∗t (l)
Pt+s
(
Pt+s−1
Pt−1
)σwi
− W
h
t+s
Pt+s
]
(17)
subject to the labor demand (15), and the indexation scheme so that Lt+s(l) =
[
W ∗t (l)
Wt+s
(
Pt+s−1
Pt−1
)σwi]−εw
Lt+s. The ﬁrst order condition is equal to
Et
∞∑
s=0
Λt,t+s (βσw)
s Lt+s(l)
[
W ∗t (l)
Pt+s
(
Pt+s−1
Pt−1
)σwi
− W
h
t+s
Pt+s
Mw,t
]
= 0 (18)
where Mw,t = εwεw−1u
w
t is the time varying gross wage mark-up and u
w
t is the wage mark-up shock
which follows an AR (1) process, ρw is an autoregressive coeﬃcient and εwmt is a serially uncorrelated,
normally distributed shock with zero mean and standard deviation σwm. The dynamics of the
aggregate wage index is expressed as
Wt+1 =
[
(1− σw)
(
W ∗t+1(l)
)1−εw + σw (Wt (Pt/Pt−1)σwi
Pt+1/Pt
)1−εw] 11−εw
(19)
A.1.3 Goods market
Competitive ﬁnal goods ﬁrms buy intermediate goods from the retailers and assemble them. Final
output is a composite of intermediate goods indexed by f ∈ (0, 1) diﬀerentiated by retailers,
Yt =
[ˆ 1
0
Yt (f)
ε−1
ε df
] ε
ε−1
(20)
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where ε is the elasticity of substitution across varieties of goods. Final goods ﬁrms solve the problem
of choosing Yt (f) to minimize the cost of production:
min
Yt(f)
ˆ 1
0
Pt (f)Yt (f) df (21)
st
[ˆ 1
0
Yt (f)
ε−1
ε df
] ε
ε−1
> Y¯ (22)
The demand function for intermediate good f is given by
Yt (f) =
(
Pt (f)
Pt
)−ε
Yt (23)
where Pt is the aggregate wage index. Equations (23) and (20) imply
Pt =
[ˆ 1
0
Pt (f)
1−ε df
] 1
1−ε
(24)
Retailers simply purchase intermediate goods at a price equal to the marginal cost and diﬀeren-
tiate them in a monopolistically competitive market, similarly to labor unions in the labor market.
Retailers set nominal prices in a staggered fashion. Each retailer resets its price with probability
(1− σp). For the fraction of retailers that cannot adjust, the price is automatically increased at the
aggregate inﬂation rate. The price for non-optimizing retailers evolves according to the following
trajectory P ∗t (f), P ∗t (f)
(
Pt
Pt−1
)σpi
, P ∗t (f)
(
Pt+1
Pt−1
)σpi
, ..., where σpi denotes the degree of price index-
ation. The real price Φt charged by intermediate goods ﬁrms in the competitive market represents
also the real marginal cost common to all ﬁnal good ﬁrms, i.e. MCt = Φt.
A retailer resetting its price in period t maximizes the following ﬂow of discounted proﬁts with
respect to P ∗t
Et
∞∑
s=0
(σpβ)
sΛt,t+sYt+s(f)
[
P ∗t (f)
Pt+s
(
Pt+s−1
Pt−1
)σpi
−MCt+s)
]
(25)
subject to the demand function (23), and the indexation scheme so that Yt+s(f) =
[
P ∗t (f)
Pt+s
(
Pt+s−1
Pt−1
)σpi]−ε
Yt+s. Let MCnt denote the nominal marginal cost. The gross mark-up charged by ﬁnal good ﬁrm f
can be deﬁned as Mt(f) ≡ Pt(f)/MCnt = Pt(f)Pt /
MCnt
Pt
= pt(f)/MCt. In the symmetric equilibrium
all ﬁnal good ﬁrms charge the same price, Pt(f) = Pt, hence the relative price is unity. It follows
that, in the symmetric equilibrium, the mark-up is simply the inverse of the marginal cost.
The ﬁrst order condition for this problem is
Et
∞∑
s=0
(σpβ)
sΛt,t+sYt+s(f)
[
P ∗t (f)
Pt+s
(
Pt+s−1
Pt−1
)σpi
−Mp,tMCt+s)
]
= 0 (26)
Similarly to the labor market, the gross time varying price mark up is Mp,t = εε−1u
p
t and u
p
t is
the price mark-up shock, which follows an AR(1) process, ρp is an autoregressive coeﬃcient and ε
pm
t
29
is a serially uncorrelated, normally distributed shock with zero mean and standard deviation σpm.
The equation describing the dynamics for the aggregate price level is given by
Pt+1 =
[
(1− σp)(P ∗t+1(f))1−ε + σp
(
Pt
(
Pt
Pt−1
)σpi)1−ε]1/(1−ε)
Intermediate goods ﬁrms produce goods in a perfectly competitive market. They maximize the
ﬂow of discounted proﬁts by choosing the quantity of factors for production
EtβΛt,t+1
[
Φt+1Yt+1 −RHt+1Kt+1 −
Wt+1
Pt+1
Lt+1
]
(27)
where Φt is the competitive real price at which intermediate good is sold and RHt is the real rental
price of capital. The production function follows a Cobb-Douglas technology:
Yt = At(Ute
k
tKt)
αL1−αt −Θ (28)
where Θ represents ﬁxed costs in production (Smets and Wouters, 2007). At is the transitory
technology shock following an AR(1) process, ρa is an autoregressive coeﬃcient and εat is a serially
uncorrelated, normally distributed shock with zero mean and standard deviation σa. Maximization
yields the following ﬁrst order conditions with respect to capital and labor:
RHt = MCtMP
K
t (29)
Wt
Pt
= MCtMP
L
t (30)
where MPKt is the marginal product of capital and MP
L
t is the marginal product of labor.
A.1.4 The policymaker and aggregation
The policymaker sets the nominal interest rate according to the following Taylor rule (SW, 2003)
ln
(
Rnt
Rn
)
= ρi ln
(
Rnt−1
Rn
)
+ (1− ρi)
[
ρpi ln
(
Πt
Π
)
+ ρy ln
(
Yt
Y pt
)]
+ρ∆y ln
(
Yt/Yt−1
Y pt /Y
p
t−1
)
+ εrt (31)
and
Rt+1 = Et
[
Rnt
Πt+1
]
(32)
where Rnt is the nominal gross interest rate, Π is the steady state inﬂation rate, Y
p
t is the level of
output that would prevail under ﬂexible prices and wages without the two mark-up shocks, and εrt
is the monetary policy shock.
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The resource constraint completes the model,
Yt = Ct + It +Gt + Ψ(Ut)Kt−1 (33)
A.2 The SWBGG model
The presence of ﬁnancial frictions originating in the demand side of the credit market alters the
set-up of intermediate goods ﬁrms compared to the SW economy. This section then presents the
set-up of capital producers which determine the price of capital (this simpliﬁes the optimization
problem of households).
A.2.1 Households
In the SWBGG model capital producers purchase investment and depreciated capital to transform
them into capital sold to ﬁrms and intermediate goods ﬁrms choose the optimal utilization rate of
capital. Hence the household simply chooses consumption, labor supply and the amount of assets,
which represent real deposits in the FI as well as real government bonds. Both intermediary deposits
and government debt are one period real bonds that pay the gross real interest rate, Rt, between t
and t+1. Both instruments are riskless and are thus perfect substitutes. This optimization problem
yields the ﬁrst-order conditions (6), (7) and (8) respectively.
A.2.2 Capital producers
Capital producers purchase at time t investment and depreciated capital to transform them into
capital sold to ﬁrms and used for production at time t+ 1. Capital producers also face adjustment
costs for investment as in Christiano et al. (2005). The law of motion of capital is then equal to
equation (4).
The proﬁts are given by the diﬀerence between the revenue from selling capital at the relative
price Qt and the costs of buying capital from intermediate goods ﬁrms and the investment needed
to build new capital. The optimality condition is a Tobin's Q equation, which relates the price of
capital to the marginal adjustment costs,
1 = Qtxt
[
1−z
(
It
It−1
)
−z′
(
It
It−1
)(
It
It−1
)]
+ βEt
[
Λt,t+1Qt+1xt+1z′
(
It+1
It
)(
It+1
It
)2]
(34)
A.2.3 Intermediate goods ﬁrms
Intermediate goods ﬁrms produce goods in a perfectly competitive market and they borrow in order
to ﬁnance the acquisition of capital. They maximize the ﬂow of discounted proﬁts by choosing the
quantity of factors for production. This problem is identical to that in the SW economy, described
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by equations (28) (30). In equilibrium the optimal capital demand is
Et
[
Rkt+1
]
= Et
[
RHt+1 + (1− δ)Qt+1ekt+1
Qt
]
(35)
where Et
[
Rkt+1
]
is the expected marginal external ﬁnancing cost.
In addition ﬁrms also decide the optimal capital utilization rate solving the following maximization
problem
max
Ut
Zkt UtKt−1 −Ψ(Ut)Kt−1 (36)
This optimization problem is summarized by the following equilibrium condition
Zkt = Ψ
′(Ut) (37)
Intermediate goods ﬁrms face also the problem of stipulating the ﬁnancial contract. BGG assume
that an agency problem makes external ﬁnance more expensive than internal funds and solve a
ﬁnancial contract that maximizes the payoﬀ to the ﬁrms subject to the lender earning the required
rate of return.12 Hence, in equilibrium, the marginal external ﬁnancing cost must equate the external
ﬁnance premium gross of the riskless real interest rate:
Rkt+1 =
[
EP
(
Nt+1
QtKt+1
)
Rt
]
(38)
with EP ′(·) < 0 and EP ′(1) = 1. As the borrower's equity stake in a project Nt+1/QtKt+1 falls,
i.e. the leverage ratio rises, the loan becomes riskier and the cost of borrowing rises. Linearisation
of equation (38) yields:13
Rˆkt+1 = Rˆt + κ[Qˆt + Kˆt+1 − Nˆt+1] (39)
where κ ≡ −∂Rk
∂N
K
N/K
Rk
= −EP ′(·)
Rk
N
KR measures the elasticity of the external ﬁnance premium with
respect to the leverage position of intermediate goods ﬁrms.
Aggregate entrepreneurial net worth evolves according to the following law of motion
Nt+1 = θ[R
k
tQt−1Kt − Et−1
[
Rkt (Qt−1Kt −Nt)
]
] + (1− θ)N et (40)
where the ﬁrst component of the right-hand-side represents the net worth of the θ fraction of surviving
entrepreneurs net of borrowing costs carried over from the previous period, and N et is the transfer
that newly entering entrepreneurs receive.
Following BGG and Gabriel et al. (2011), monitoring costs are ignored in the resource constraint
since, under reasonable parameterizations, they have negligible impact on model's dynamics.
12See BGG, Appendix, for the derivation of the ﬁnancial contract and for the aggregation.
13A variable with a `hat' denotes a percentage deviation from steady state.
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A.3 The SWGK model
The presence of ﬁnancial frictions à la Gertler and Karadi does not aﬀect the optimization problem
of households, which is the same as in SWBGG, although their structure is slightly diﬀerent as
explained in the text. This subsection ﬁrst presents the features of ﬁnancial intermediaries (FI) and
then of intermediate goods ﬁrms.
A.3.1 Financial intermediaries
The ﬁnancial intermediaries' balance sheet simply states that net worth and deposits should be equal
to the quantity of ﬁnancial claims on intermediate goods ﬁrms times the price of each claim, QtSt.
Net worth (or bank capital) evolves as follows:
Nt+1 = R
k
t+1QtSt −RtBt+1 (41)
where Rkt+1 represents the non-contingent real gross return on assets.
The problem of moral hazard consists in the fact that the banker can choose to divert the fraction λ
of available funds from the project and transfer them back to her household. The depositors require
to be willing to supply funds to the banker that the gains from diverting assets should be less or
equal than the costs of doing so:
Υt ≥ λQtSt (42)
where Υt is the expected terminal wealth, deﬁned as
Υt = Et
∞∑
s=0
(1− θ) θsβs+1Λt,t+1+s
[(
Rkt+1+s −Rt+s
)
Qt+sSt+s +Rt+1+sNt+s
]
(43)
Equation (42) translates in the following constraint for the FI,
QtSt = levtNt (44)
where levt stands for the FI leverage ratio. The agency problem introduces an endogenous balance
sheet constraint for the FI.
Total net worth is the sum of net worth of existing bankers, N e, and net worth of new bankers,
Nn, which are deﬁned as:
N et+1 = θ[(R
k
t+1 −Rt)levt +Rt]Nt (45)
Nnt = χQtSt (46)
A.3.2 Intermediate goods ﬁrms
Intermediate goods ﬁrms maximize proﬁts in a perfectly competitive market and borrow from FI.
In order to make a meaningful comparison, the three models are as closer as possible, and the
optimization problems of intermediate goods ﬁrms follow SWBGG, i.e. equations (29), (30), (37)
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and (35). Each intermediate goods ﬁrm ﬁnances the acquisition of capital, Kt+1, by obtaining funds
from the FI. The ﬁrm issues St state-contingent claims equal to the number of units of capital
acquired and prices each claim at the price of a unit of capital Qt,
QtKt+1 = QtSt (47)
B Counterfactual exercises for impulse responses
Two considerations are worth mentioning for all the shocks: (1) a change in the spread exerts a
diﬀerent eﬀect on the dynamics of the relevant net worth in the SWBGG and the SWGK models; and
(2) the structural parameters diﬀer between the two models as evident from Table 4. It is important
to check whether these factors could account for the diﬀerence in the transmission mechanism of the
shocks between the models.
As far as the ﬁrst issue is concerned, a contractionary shock generally causes a rise in the spread,
a fall in net worth and a decrease in investment. However, a rise in the spread aﬀects the dynamics
of the relevant net worth in a diﬀerent way, as explained in the main text: in the SWGK model the
proﬁts of ﬁnancial intermediaries increase and this helps ﬁnancial intermediaries to rebuild quickly
their net worth. In the SWBGG model, instead, a rise in the borrowing costs causes a protracted
decline in net worth of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. This subsection shows a counterfactual exercise in order
to mitigate the eﬀects of the spread on the dynamics of net worth of ﬁnancial intermediaries in the
SWGK model. In order to do so, the steady state leverage is calibrated at 2, while in the baseline
calibration it is equal to 4. A reduction in the steady state leverage substantially aﬀects the dynamics
of net worth, as evident from equation (20b) in Table 1. Figures 7 and 8 show that a reduction in
the steady state leverage of ﬁnancial intermediaries aﬀects impulse responses. Each chart reports
the mean responses in the baseline SWGK model featuring a steady state leverage of 4  black solid
line  and the counterfactual SWGK model where steady state leverage is equal to 2  black dotted
line. The blue dashed lines report the mean responses in the baseline SWBGG model. Figure 7
shows EA impulse responses to the shocks which are quantitatively more important in terms of the
variance decomposition analysis. The dynamics of net worth is substantially aﬀected for all the
three shocks. The impact response of net worth in the counterfactual SWGK model is closer to
that of the SWBGG model. At the same time, the rise in the spread is more pronounced in the
counterfactual SWGK model compared to the SWBGG model. This is explained by the fact that the
tighter incentive constraint leads to a higher spread and, hence, to a higher proﬁtability for ﬁnancial
intermediaries. In the case of the capital quality and TFP shocks, the stronger ampliﬁcation eﬀect on
output and investment is still present in the counterfactual SWGK model, albeit to a minor extent.
In the case of the investment-speciﬁc technology shock, the moderate increase in net worth leads to a
positive response of the spread in the counterfactual experiment, causing a less pronounced increase
in investment and hence a more severe decline in output. With the exception of the investment-
speciﬁc technology shock, overall the magnitude of the ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect on output in the
SWGK model (lev=4) is double compared to the eﬀect obtained in a SWGK model with leverage
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Figure 7: EA impulse responses. The solid black lines represent the mean responses in the SWGK
model, where the steady state leverage of ﬁnancial intermediaries is 4 and the steady state spread
is 150 bps; the black dotted lines represent the responses of a counterfactual SWGK model with
a steady state leverage of ﬁnancial intermediaries equal to 2; and the blue dashed lines represent
the mean responses in the SWBGG model. The size of the shocks is normalized to one standard
deviation.
equal to two.
Figure 8 shows the eﬀect of the counterfactual experiment on the models estimated for the United
States. Results are similar to those for the Euro Area: the dynamics of net worth in the SWGK
model is indeed aﬀected by the value of the steady state leverage ratio. The rise in the spread is
generally more pronounced in the counterfactual SWGK model compared to the SWBGG model.
However, in the case of the capital quality shock the impact response of the spread in the SWBGG
model is higher than that of the counterfactual SWGK model. This can also be explained by the
higher estimate of elasticity of the external ﬁnance premium with respect to the leverage position
of ﬁrms in the US compared to that in the EA. And the ampliﬁcation eﬀect of the SWGK model is
minor in the counterfactual model compared to the baseline speciﬁcation.
The role of the diﬀerent structural parameters is relevant only for the price mark-up shock in
the models estimated for the Euro Area. The more severe fall in output in the SWBGG model
compared to that in the SWGK model, shown in Figure 4, is only explained by the higher estimated
persistence of the price mark-up shock in the former model.
C Robustness analysis
This subsection illustrates whether the better ﬁt of the SWGK model is robust: (i) to a larger
estimation sample; (ii) to the calibration of the steady state leverage ratio of the SWBGG and
SWGK models; and (iii) to the models' speciﬁcation. It ﬁnally presents the likelihood race when
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Figure 8: US impulse responses. The solid black lines represent the mean responses in the baseline
SWGK model, where the steady state leverage of ﬁnancial intermediaries is 4 and the steady state
spread is 150 bps; the black dotted lines represent the responses of a counterfactual SWGK model
with a steady state leverage of ﬁnancial intermediaries equal to 2; and the blue dashed lines represent
the mean responses in the SWBGG model. The size of the shocks is normalized to one standard
deviation.
allowing for measurement errors for inﬂation and wages. All these robustness exercises are based on
100,000 draws from the random walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
The ﬁrst row of the Table 10 shows that, even including data for the recent ﬁnancial crisis, the
SWGK model still performs better. The Bayes factor and the KR statistics are of the order of
magnitude similar to those in Table 5. However, these results should be interpreted cautiously due
to the non-linearities induced by the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate in the latest
observations.
The importance of the value of the leverage is stressed by several studies, such as Jordà et al.
(2011) among many others. In the SWBGG model a change in the steady state leverage ratio, KN ,
has a direct impact on equation (16a) in Table 1. In the SWGK model a change in the steady state
leverage ratio, lev, aﬀects the evolution of net worth of FI, equation (20b) in Table 1. In both models
any change in the leverage ratio clearly inﬂuences the ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect as also evident from
the counterfactual exercises presented in Figures 7 and 8.
The leverage ratio is equal to 2 in the SWBGG model and 4 in the SWGK model as shown in
the baseline calibration, Table 3. Table 10 shows how the Bayes factor is aﬀected by changes in the
leverage ratio of the two models one at a time.14 In the SWBGG model the leverage ratio of ﬁrms
changes from 1.5 to 4.5, implying that from 33% to 78% of ﬁrms' capital expenditure are externally
ﬁnanced. The second column of Table 10 reports the BF between the log data density of the SWGK
14For each speciﬁcation the log data density of the SWGK model is computed with the modiﬁed harmonic mean
estimator.
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model and the log data density of the SWBGG model for the EA. Similarly, the last column reports
this statistics between the log data density of the SWGK model and that of the SWBGG model for
the US. The comparison between the SWBGG and SWGK models shows that for both economies
the SWGK model is always favored by the data independently of the value of the leverage ratio
in the SWBGG model. The second part of the table shows how the Bayes factor varies when the
leverage ratio of ﬁnancial intermediaries changes from 3 to 5.5 in the SWGK model. There is clear
evidence in favor of the SWGK model also in comparison to the SWBGG model. It is also worth
noting that when ﬁrms and ﬁnancial intermediaries have the same leverage ratio  3, 3.5, 4, and 4.5
 the SWGK model is always the preferred one.
Both models embed the same types of nominal and real frictions. As a further robustness check,
each of the main common frictions is turned oﬀ one at a time in the spirit of Smets and Wouters
(2007). This experiment makes also it possible to assess which frictions are important. The ﬁrst row
of Table 11 reports the log data density of the baseline estimates. No matter which friction is turned
oﬀ, there is always evidence in favor of the SWGK model compared to the SWBGG model both in
the EA and the US. The removal of each friction at a time has a similar eﬀects in the models. On
the side of nominal frictions, removing price stickiness implies a considerable deterioration in terms
of the log data density. On the side of real frictions, the most important in terms of the log data
density is investment adjustment costs. A larger value of the capital utilization elasticity implies
higher marginal depreciation cost, and therefore less variation in capital utilization. Removing this
friction does not imply a deterioration of the log data density; its value is even higher in all models.
As a robustness exercise, the parameter κ, measuring the elasticity of the external ﬁnance pre-
mium to the leverage position of ﬁrms in the SWBGG model, is calibrated to match steady state
values of the ﬁnancial variables. In this case the log data density is equal to −357.50398 for the
SWBGG model estimated for the EA and to −543.82403 for the SWBGG model estimated for the
US. Hence, the SWGK model is still the one favored both by EA and US data.
Table 12 shows the log data density of the models estimated allowing for measurement errors
for inﬂation and wages, as well as for a moving-average component in the price and wage mark up
shocks. The ranking of the models is not aﬀected, being the SWGK model the preferred one.
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Euro Area United States
SWBGG SWGK SWBGG SWGK
1983Q1-2011Q4 sample −400.63847 −387.16815 −653.30347 −649.15901
Changes in the steady state leverage in the SWBGG model
Steady state leverage BF = L((Y |m¯SWGK)
L(Y |mSWBGG) BF =
L((Y |m¯SWGK)
L(Y |mSWBGG)
1.5 1.9× 107 5.3× 102
2 2.8× 105 5.6× 102
2.5 8.1× 104 8.7× 102
3 4.6× 104 2.7× 103
3.5 1.8× 104 1.9× 104
4 1.4× 104 1.5× 105
4.5 1.6× 104 1.6× 106
Changes in the steady state leverage in the SWGK model
Steady state leverage BF = L((Y |mSWGK)
L(Y |m¯SWBGG) BF =
L((Y |mSWGK)
L(Y |m¯SWBGG)
3 1.4× 104 2.7× 102
3.5 1.7× 105 3.7× 102
4 2.8× 105 5.6× 102
4.5 1.6× 105 3.3× 102
5 3.5× 105 2.7× 102
5.5 1.1× 105 2.2× 102
Table 10: Models comparisons for alternative robustness exercises
Euro Area United States
SWBGG SWGK SWBGG SWGK
Baseline −357.27 −344.74 −545.60 −539.28
σp = 0.1, Calvo prices −406.18 −400.21 −610.55 −604.20
σw = 0.1, Calvo wages −378.27 −368.62 −576.36 −573.77
h = 0.1, habit parameter −384.74 −374.55 −550.81 −542.15
ξ = 0.1, invest. adj. costs −415.33 −412.64 −596.30 −593.48
ζ = 0.99, elasticity of capital util. −340.52 −327.97 −537.97 −530.28
Θ = 1.1, ﬁxed costs in production −357.12 −347.40 −544.83 −541.24
Table 11: Log data density for diﬀerent models' speciﬁcations
Euro Area United States
SWBGG SWGK SWBGG SWGK
Relative standard deviations
Inﬂation 0.14 [0.12;0.16] 0.15 [0.13;0.17] 0.09 [0.07;0.11] 0.09 [0.07;0.11]
Interest rate 0.15 [0.11;0.17] 0.16 [0.12;0.18] 0.13 [0.10;0.15] 0.14 [0.10;0.17]
Log data density −339.50 −332.54 −527.78 −522.20
Table 12: Relative standard deviations to output and log data density when allowing for measure-
ment errors
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